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Abstract: We generalize the Banzhaf value in multialternative games defined by Bolger (1993).
This value is produced by axioms similar to those of the Bolger value, just as the Banzhaf value
produced by axioms similar to Shapley’s.
1 Introduction
In characteristic function form simple games, players simply vote yea or nay. The mul-
tialternative game was first defined in Bolger (1993): the game contains more than two
alternatives. Games allowing more than two coalitions have been also formulated as parti-
tion function games. Although the partition function game only refers to the formation of
groups, the multialternative games makes clear which group of players chooses which al-
ternative. They are very useful, especially to examine voting situations with three or more
alternatives. Bolger defined a value based on a system of axioms, which is a generalization
of the Shapley value (Shapley (1988)).
To evaluate voting situations, the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965), Lehrer (1988)) is
used as well as the Shapley value. Our purposes is to generalize the Banzhaf value in
multialternative games. We will modify Bolger’s axioms using the idea of Straffin (1976).
2 Multialternative Games and Bolger Value
2.1 Definition of Multialternative Games
In characteristic function form games, the characteristic function is given as $u:2^{N}arrow\Re$
$(u(\emptyset)=0)$ , where $2^{N}$ is the set of all coalition $S\subset N=\{1, \cdots, n\}$ , and $\Re$ is the set
of real numbers. In multialternative games, we consider not only $N$ but also the set
of alternatives $A=\{a_{1}, \cdot, . , a_{r}\}$ . The set $S_{j}(j=1, \cdots, r)$ is the coalition consisting
of players who choose $a_{j}$ . The set $S_{j}$ may be empty. The ordered coalition structure
$P=(S_{1}, \cdots, S_{r})$ is called an arrangement, where $\bigcup_{j=1j}^{r}S=N$ and $S_{j}\cap S_{j’}=\emptyset$ if $j\neq j’$ .
Let $j$ be fixed, and denote the set of pairs of $S_{j}$ and an arrangement containing it by $\mathcal{P}^{j}$ .
That is,
$\prime \mathrm{p}^{j}=$ { $(S_{j},$ $P)|s_{j}\subset N,$ $S_{j}$ is the $j\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ element of $P$}.




$P^{j}(i)=\{(S_{j}, P)\in P^{j}|S_{j}\ni i\}$ .
We will also define the characteristic function just as in cooperative games. Although the
characteristic function of cooperative games is defined with respect to a coalition, Bolger’s
characteristic function $v$ is defined on $\mathcal{P}$ , or $v:Parrow\Re$ . The emptyset is always assumed
to take $0$ , or $v(\emptyset, P)=0$ . The set of Bolger’s characteristic functions is denoted by $\Gamma$ . The
triple $(N, A, v)$ , or $v$ when players and alternatives are clear, is called a multialternative
game.
Note that fuction $v$ depends not only on $S_{j}$ but $P$ the $j\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ component of which is $S_{j}$ .
When there are only two alternatives, one coalition $S$ determines the other $N\backslash S$ . In
contrast, suppose a four-person voting game with three alternatives. Suppose the coalition
$S_{j}$ wins if and only if $S_{j}$ contains more than the number of members in the other $S_{k}’ \mathrm{s}$
$(k\neq j)$ . Formally, for each $j=1,$ $\cdots,$ $r$ , .
$v(S_{j}, P)=\{$
1, if $|S_{j}|> \max\{|s_{k}| : k\neq j\}$
$0$ . otherwise
Then {1, 2} wins if 3 and 4 vote different candidates, but it loses if 3 and 4 vote the same
candidate. Thus whether a coalition wins depends not only its size but also the size of
other coalitions.
The partition function form game due to Lucas-Thrall (1963) also gives a similar
generalization of the usual characteristic function. The partition function is defined with
respect to a coalition $S$ and a coalition structure $Q\ni S^{1}$ . Games of this form have been
studied in many literatures. The Bolger’s multialternative games is, however, basically
different from the partition function form game. Suppose the example of the United
Nations Security Council given in Bolger (1993). If most of the members in $N$ vote
yea (or nay), their claim will be adopted and the issue will be accepted (or rejected).
But if they abstain, the result depends upon the votes of the other members. In this
sense, alternatives yea, nay and abstain are not homogeneous. This is not captured by
the partition function form representation. The Bolger’s characteristic function, however,
enables us to distinguish the situations where all the members choose yea, nay and abstain
by giving three values,
$v(N, (N, \emptyset, \emptyset)),$ $v(N, (\emptyset, N, \emptyset))$ and $v(N, (\emptyset, \emptyset, N))$ ,
to these three situations.
2.2 Bolger Value
In the following, for convenience, fix one $j$ and define a value for this particular $j$ . Pick
an arrangement $P$ that has the $j\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ element $S_{j}$ . Suppose $i\in S_{j}$ . Define $\alpha_{iS_{k}}$ as
$\alpha_{iS_{k}}(P)=(S_{1}, \cdots, S_{j}\backslash \{i\}, \cdots, S_{k}\cup\{i\}, \cdots, S_{r})$ .
1Set $Q=$ { $S_{1},$ $\cdots$ , Se} is called a partition or a coalition structure, if $\bigcup_{j=1j}^{t}S=N$ and $S_{j}\cap S_{j’}=\emptyset$ for
$j\neq j’$ . The partition function is defined on $(S, Q)$ , where $S\ni Q$ . Thus the partition function for $(S, Q)$
gives the quantity the members in $S$ could gain if the coalition structure is $Q$ .
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This function moves player $i$ from $S_{j}$ to $S_{k}$ in a given arrangement $P$ .
Functions $\theta^{j}$ : $\Gammaarrow\Re^{n}$ are called value functions, where $\Re^{n}$ is the set of n-dimensional
real vectors. Just as the Shapley value2, the Bolger value $\theta^{j}(v)$ is derived from a system
of axioms.
Axiom 1 ($j$-efficiency) $\Sigma_{i\in N}\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=v(N;j)$ , where $(N;j)\backslash means$ that all the players
are in $S_{j};i.e.$ ,
$(N;j)=(N, (\emptyset, \cdots, \emptyset, N_{J}. , \emptyset, \cdots, \emptyset))$ .
This axiom, which Bolger did not treat as an axiom, corresponds to Shapley’s efficiency
axiom. The following three axioms correspond to Shaley’s dummy player, additivity and
symmetry axioms.
Axiom 2 ($j$-dummy) Player $i$ is a $j$ -dummy in $(N, A, v)$ if for all $(S_{j}, P)\in P^{j}(i)$ and
for all $k\neq j$ ,
$v(S_{j}, P)=v(S_{j}\backslash \{i\}, \alpha_{iS}k(P))\sim$.
If player $i$ is a $j$ -dummy, then $\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=0$ .
Axiom 3 (linearity) Pick two multialternative games $(N, A, v)$ and $(N, A, w)$ and a
real number $c$, define the games $v+w$ and $cv$ as
$(v+w)(S_{j}, P)=v(S_{j}, P)+w(S_{j}, P)$ ,
and
$(cv)(sj, P)=c\cdot v(S_{j}, P)$ ,




2Shapley’s axioms are as follows;
efficiency : $\sum_{i\in N}\varphi i(u)=v(N)$
dummy player : if $u(S)=u(S\backslash \{i\})$ for all $S\ni i$ , the value $\varphi_{i}(u)=0$ .
additivity : $\varphi(u)+\varphi(u’)=\varphi(u+u’)$
symmetry : Let $\pi$ : $Narrow N$ be a permutation; then, $\varphi_{i}(u)=\varphi_{\pi i}(\pi u)$ .
Then the Shapley value, which is a unique value $\varphi$ satisfying axioms above, is
$\varphi_{i}(u)=\sum_{sS\subset N,\ni i}\frac{(s-1)!(n-S)!}{n!}[u(s)-u(s\backslash \{i\})]$ .
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Axiom 4 (symmetry) Let $\pi$ : $Narrow N$ be a permutation, and define a game $\pi v$ as
$\pi v(S_{j}, P)=v(\pi S_{j}, \pi P)$ ,
where $\pi P=(\pi S_{1}, \cdots, \pi S_{r})$ . Then, $\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=\theta_{\pi i}^{j}(\pi v)$ .
Bolger added another axiom, called a pivot move axiom.
Axiom 5 (pivot move) With respect to any two multialtemative games $(N, A, v)$ and
$(N, A, w)$ , if for all $(S_{j}, P)\in P^{j}(i)$ ,
$\sum_{k\neq j}[v(S_{j}, P)-v(S_{j\backslash }\{i\}, \alpha is_{k}(P))]=\sum_{k\neq j}[w(Sj, P)-w(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha iSk(P))]$
,
then $\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=\theta_{i}^{j}(w)$ .
This last axiom considers that player $i$ changes his choice from $j$ to another option when
he is in $S_{j}$ , the $j\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ element of $P$ . It claims that the same value should be given in two
games $v$ and $w$ if changes of $v$ and $w$ induced by changes of $i’ \mathrm{s}$ choice are the same in
total. Suppose orders of the alternatives are different: $v$ considers $S_{1},$ $S_{2}$ and $S_{3}$ as the
groups of yea, nay and abstain, respectively; $w$ considers them as yea, abstain and nay,
respectively. Formally, for example, $v(S_{1}, (S_{1}, s_{2}, S_{3}))=w(S_{1}, (S_{1}, S_{\mathrm{s}}, S_{2}))$ holds. The
pivot move axiom guarantees the value for $v$ and for $w$ should be the same.
Theorem 1 (Bolger (1993)) For all $(N, A, v)$ , value function $\theta^{j}(v)$ satisfies Axioms
1-5, if and only if
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=(sj,P)\sum\sum_{k\in Pj(i)\neq j}\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-S_{j})!}{n!(r-1)n-s_{j}+1}[v(s_{j}, P)-v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha is_{k}(P))]$ , (1)
where $s_{j}=|S_{j}|$ .
For the subsequent discussion, let us briefly review his proof. If part is easily shown. To
show the only if part, construct basis games $\{v^{\tau_{j},Q}|(\tau_{j}, Q)\in P^{j}\}$ as follows;
$v^{T_{j},Q}(S_{j}, P)=\{$
1, if $S_{j}=T_{j}$ and $P=Q$
$0$ . otherwise
(2)
First, construct the value $\theta_{i}^{j}$ for $v^{T_{j},Q}$ , and then obtain the value for general $v$ , using the
equation
$v= \sum_{s_{j}(,P)\in Pj}v(sj, P)v^{S_{j},P}$
, (3)
and the linearity axiom. Though the basis game $v^{T_{j},Q}$ correspond to the unanimity game
used in Shapley (1988), note that player $i\not\in T_{j}$ is not a $j$-dummy player. In fact, he can
make the losing coalition $T_{j}\cup\{i\}$ with respect to $Q’$ win by changing his vote to $k$ , where
$\alpha_{iS_{k}}(Q’)=Q$ . To evaluate $\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{T_{j},Q})$ , Axiom 4 plays an important roll.
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An intuitive interpretation can be given in the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ manner. Fix the player $i\in S_{j}$ ,
pick the other $(s_{j}-1)$ members out of $N\backslash \{i\}$ arbitrary. Then, there are
$\frac{(n-1)!}{(s_{j}-1)!(n-sj)!}$
possibilties of $S_{j}$ . Any member out of $S_{j}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ one of the alternatives $A\backslash \{a_{j}\}$ with
equal probability $1/(r-1)$ . Then the probability that a $(S_{j}, P)$ oc..curs is
$\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-S_{j})!}{n!(r-1)^{n-S_{j}}}$ ,
and there are $(r-1)$ patterns that move $i$ to the other coalitions $S_{k}(k\neq j)$ . Thus the
coefficient is obtained. The Bolger value is considered to be a multialternative general-
ization of the wellknown Shapley value; it is clear that when $r=2$ , it gives the Shapley
value.
3 A Banzhaf-type Value and Its Axiomatization
The axioms for the Banzhaf value was first given in Dubey-Shapley (1979), and later
modified by Lehrer (1988). The Banzhaf index can be obtained by counting swings,
players’ combinations of yea and nay in which player $i$ can change the final outcome.
Dubey-Shapley used three indices related to Banzhaf index. One is the ‘raw’ Banzhaf
index, which is simply the number of swings. Another one is normalized so that the sum
of indices over players equals 1. This is just what Banzhaf (1965) originally obtained.
The last one is called the swing probability, which is $1/2^{n-1}$ times ‘raw’ one. This is
derived from the assumption that all the players except $i$ vote yea and nay with equal
probabilities. To obtain the ‘raw’ Banzhaf index, they used total swing axiom instead of
Shapley’s efficiency axiom, which claims the sum of the number of swings over players
coincides with the sum of indices. Following their total swing axiom, we use the following
axiom instead of Axiom 1.
Axiom 6 (total contribution) Let define a contribution of player $i$ by choosing $a_{j}$ as
$\eta_{i}^{j}(v)=\sum_{(S_{j^{P}},)\in P^{j}(i)}\sum_{jk\neq}[v(sj, P)-v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha is_{k}(P))]$,




Before the theorem, let us define $S$-unanimity game $v^{S}$ as follows;
$v^{S}(s_{j}, P)=\{$
1, if $S_{j}\supset S$
$0$ . otherwise
This is the game that any coalition including $S$ wins regardless of arrangements.
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Theorem 2 For all $(N, A, v)$ , value function $\theta^{j}(v)$ satisfies Axioms 2,3,4,5 and 6, if
and only if





Proof. The if part can be easily shown. To show the only if part, let $v^{S_{j},P}$ and $i\in S$ .
Then, Axiom 6 implies $\overline{\eta}^{j}(v^{S_{j}}’)P=s_{j}(r-1)$ , because each member in $S_{j}$ can make the
coalition lose by changing his choice $k(k\neq j)$ . Thus, $\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{\mathit{8}_{j},P})=r-1$ from Axiom 3.
When $i\not\in S$ , on the other hand, the inclusion-exclusion principle implies
$(S_{j},P) \in \mathcal{P}(s_{j}=\sum_{j,si)}\theta^{j}(iv^{S_{j}}’)P=\sum^{s}n-t=1(-1)^{t}-\tau\subset N\backslash T\ni\sum_{|s_{i}\tau|=t},\theta_{i}j(v^{S\cup})T$
(5)





$r^{n-s}(r-1)$ , if $i\in S$
$0$ , otherwise











Consequently, the value for the basis game $v^{S_{j},P}$ is summarized as
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{S_{j^{P}}}’)=\{$
$r-1$ , if $i\in S_{j}$
$-1$ , if $i\not\in S_{j}$
(7)
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By the definition of the basis games (2) and Axiom 3,
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v)$ $=$
$(S_{j},P \sum_{j)\in \mathrm{p}}v(s_{j}, P)\theta i(jv)s_{j},P$
$=$
. $(r-1) \sum_{i(sj,P)\in P^{j}()}v(Sj, P)+(-1)\sum_{\in(Sj,P)Pj\backslash \mathrm{p}j(i)}v(S_{j}, P)$
$=$
$(r-1) \sum_{P(sj,)\in Pj(i)}v(sj, P)-\sum_{P(s_{j},)\in Pj(i)k}\sum_{j\neq}v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha isk(P))$
$=$
$\sum_{(S_{j^{P)(}},\in P^{j}i)k\neq j}\sum[v(sj, P)-v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha iSk(P))]$
.
Q.E.D.
Although this axiomatization corresponds to Bolger’s axioms, Axiom 6 seems too
self-induced. In fact, Dubey-Shapley’s total swing axiom has been modified later by
Lehrer (1988) and Straffin (1976). In the following section, we will present an axiomati-
zation based on the idea of Straffin (1976).
4 Another Axiomatization
4.1 The Bolger Value
Straffin (1976) introduced a little different axioms from Shapley’s. He used an axiom
concerning unanimity games3 instead of the efficiency axiom. We use the following axiom
instead of Axioms 1 and 4.
Axiom 7 For all $i$ in $S,$ $\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{s})=1/s$ .
Theorem 3 For all $(N, A, v)$ , a value function $\theta^{j}(v)satisfie\mathit{8}$ Axioms 2,3,5 and 7, if
and only if it is given as (1).
Before proceeding to the proof, let us prepare three lemmas.
Lemma 1
$-= \frac{t}{t+1}$ . (8)
3Define a unanimity game $u^{T}$ as
$u^{T}(S)=\{$
1, if $S\supset T$
$0$ . otherwise
Using the following axioms
unanimity game I :For any unanimity game $u^{T}$ , the value $\varphi_{i}(u^{T})=1/|T|$ for all $i\in T$ .
unanimity game II :For any unanimity game $u^{T}$ , the value $\varphi_{i}(u^{T})=1/2^{|T|-1}$ for all $i\in T$ .





















be $A_{t}$ in Lemma 2. Then, the preceding two lemmas similarly make (11) equal
$n-s \sum_{t=0}^{-}(-1)2t\frac{1}{3}$
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Repeatedly calculating it $k(1\leq k\leq n-s)$ times in the same way yields
$\sum_{t=0}^{n-S-}k(-1)^{t}\frac{1}{k+1}$




Proof of Theorem 3. Since it is clear that (1) satisfies $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{x}\dot{\mathrm{i}}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{S}}2,3,5$ and 7, it is sufficient
to show the only if part. Assume that $\theta_{i}^{J}$
’
satisfies these axioms. Let $S\subset N$ be fixed; then
$\sum_{P\in P^{j},Sj=s}v^{s_{j}}’ P=\sum^{n-S}t=0[(-1)^{t}\sum_{|S,\tau|=t}v^{S\cup T]}T\subset N\backslash \cdot$ (12)
by the inclusion-exclusion principle. For $i\in S$ , using Axioms 3 and 7, we obtain
$\sum_{P\in P^{j},sj=s}\theta ij(v^{s_{j}}’ P)$
$= \sum_{t=0}^{n-S}[(-1)^{t}\tau\subset N\backslash S\sum_{|\tau|=t},\theta_{i}j(v)S\cup\tau]$
$= \sum_{t=0}^{n-s}(-1)t\frac{1}{s+t}$ . (13)
Further, since Axiom 5 implies each term in the left side takes the same value, fixing an
$(S_{j}, P)$ with $S_{j}=S$ makes the left side equal
$(r-1)^{n}-S\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{S_{j}}’)P$ .





For $i\not\in S$ , on the other hand, Axioms 2, 3 and 5 imply (5) and (6). Thus, from Axiom 7,







$=$ $- \frac{1}{s-1}$ , (14)
from Lemma 3, which implies
$\theta_{i}^{?}(v^{s_{j}}’ P)=-\frac{(s-2)!(n-S+1)!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s}}$ .
The value for the basis game $v^{S_{j},P}$ is summarized as
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{s_{j}}’)P=\{$
$\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-S_{j})!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s}j}$ , if $i\in S_{j}$
$- \frac{(s_{j}-2)!(n-s_{j}+1)!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s}j}$ , if $i\not\in S_{j}$
By the definition of the basis games (2) and Axiom 3,
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v).=\sum_{(s_{j},P)\in \mathcal{P}^{j}}v(.s_{j}, P)\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{S_{j}}’)P$
$= \sum_{(S_{j},P)\in \mathcal{P}^{j}(i)}\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-sj)!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s_{j}}}v(Sj, P)+\sum_{\backslash (sj,P)\in PjPj(i)}\frac{(s_{j}-2)!(n-s_{j}+1)!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s}j}v(S_{j}, P)$
$= \sum_{(s_{j},P)\in \mathcal{P}j(i)}\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-S_{j})!}{n!(r-1)^{n-s}j}v(s_{j}, P)-(S_{j},P)\sum_{i\in \mathcal{P}^{j}()k}\sum\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-S_{j})!}{n!(r-1)n-(sj-1)}\neq jv(S_{j}\backslash \{i\}, \alpha_{i}sk(P))$
$= \sum_{(S_{j)}P)\in Pj(i)}\sum_{k\neq j}\frac{(s_{j}-1)!(n-sj)!}{n!(r-1)^{n}-sj+1}[v(s_{j}, P)-v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha is_{k}(P))]$ .
Q.E.D.
4.2 The Banzhaf-type Value
In this section, consider another value for multialternative games based on the Banzhaf
value. We follow the next axiom given by Straffin (1976). Straffin changed the axiom
concerning with unanimity games. Here, we follow his axioms.
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Axiom 8 For all $i$ in $S,$ $\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{s_{)}}=1/r^{s-1}$ .
To explain the difference between Axioms 7 and 8, he used the idea of the lottery that
makes $i\in S$ a dictator or a dummy. Under the situation of Axiom 7, players in $S$ face a
lottery that makes a player a dictator with probability $1/s$ and a dummy with $1-1/s$ .
That is to say, exactly one out of $s$ players can be a dictator. Under the situation of
Axiom 8, on the other hand, players face a lottery that one be a dictator with $1/r^{s-1}$ and
a dummy with $1-1/r^{s-1}$ . In this case, $\mathrm{p}\tilde{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}i\in S$ can be a dictator only when all of
the others in $S$ agree. Assuming that they choose $a_{j}$ with probability $1/r$ , we obtain that
$i$ becomes a dictator with probability $1/r^{s-1}$ .
Then a value is obtained following to Banzhaf’s idea.
Theorem 4 For all $(N, A, v),$ $\theta^{j}(v)$ satisfies Axioms 2,3,5 and 8, if and only if
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v)=\frac{1}{r^{n-1}(r-1)}(S_{j},P)\sum_{\in P^{j}(i)}\sum_{jk\neq}[v(sj, P)-v(Sj\backslash \{i\}, \alpha iSk(P))]$ . (15)
Proof. The outline of the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 2. Since it is clear that
(15) satisfies Axioms 2,3,5 and 8, it is also sufficient to show the only if part. Assume
that $\theta_{i}^{j}$ satisfies these axioms, and let $S\subset N$ be fixed; then (12) follows. For $i\in S$ , using
Axioms 3 and 8, we obtain
$(s_{j},Ps_{j} \sum_{()\in \mathcal{P}^{j}i)}.\theta_{i}j(v\backslash \cdot Sj,P)$
$=$
$\sum_{t=0}^{n-s}[(-1)^{t}\sum_{\tau\subset\backslash s,|T|=t}.\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{s}\cup\tau N]|)$
$=$ $\sum_{t=0}^{n-s}(-1)t\frac{1}{r^{s+t-1}}$ . (16)















$(r-1)^{n}-s\theta^{j}i(v^{s_{j}}’ P)$ $=$ $\frac{1}{r^{n-1}}\sum_{t=1}^{s}(-1)n-tr^{n-s-t}$
$=$ $- \frac{1}{r^{n-1}}\sum_{0t=}^{n-S-}1(-1)^{t}r^{n-s-}t-1$
$=$ $- \frac{(r-1)n-S-1}{r^{n-1}}$ ,
which implies
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{S_{j},P})=-\frac{1}{r^{n-1}(r-1)}$ .
Consequently, the value for the basis game $v^{S_{j},P}$ is summarized as
$\theta_{i}^{j}(v^{s_{j}}’)P=$
’
$\frac{1}{r^{n-1}}$ , if $i\in S_{j}$
$\backslash \frac{-1}{r^{n-1}(r-1)}$ , if $i\not\in S_{j}$
Note that this value is $1/r^{n-1}(r-1)$ times (7). By the definition of the basis games (2)
and Axiom 3, equation (15) holds. $\mathrm{Q}.\mathrm{E}$ .D.
When $r=2$ , value $\sigma_{i}^{\dot{\mathfrak{U}}}(\prime v)$ gives the swing probability. Thus, this $\theta_{i}^{j}(v)$ is a generalization
of it. An interpretation of this value is given in the following way. If all the players except
$i$ vote yea or nay with equal probabilities 1/2, a combination of yea and nay occurs with
probability $1/2^{n-1}$ . Similarly, if they choose one of $r$ alternatives with equal probabilities,
a combination of their choices occurs with $1/r^{n-1}$ . Here, player $i$ also has $(r-1)$ options;
that is, he may change his choice from $j$ to one of the other $(r-1)$ alternatives. Thus,
this value is also a swing probability where player $i$ and his option $j$ are fixed.
5 Concluding Remarks
Multialternative games are useful to treat voting situations with more than two alterna-
tives. We have proposed a multialternative generalization of the Banzhaf value.
We first modified Bolger $(1993)’ \mathrm{s}$ axioms. Replacing the $j$-efficiency axiom by the
total contribution axiom, just as in Dubey-Shapley (1977), yielded a generalized Banzhaf
value, which we called the Banzhaf-type value.
But the total contribution axiom seems too self-induced. Thus, we use another ax-
iomatization following Straffin (1976). There are two kinds of axioms with respect to
unanimity games. One is that all the members should allocate the total value equally.
Using this instead of the $j$-efficiency and symmetry axioms yields the Bolger value. The
other is based on the situation that all the members choose an alternative with equal
probability. Using this instead of the symmetry and the total contribution axiom yields
the Banzhaf-type value.
We have followed the axiomatizations of Dubey-Shapley (1977) and Straffin (1976).
Lehrer (1988) presented another axiomatization. He used an axiom called superadditivity,
which is a kind of consistecy. An axiomatization following it will be done in the future.
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